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<title>Sayı 53</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12723/2490</link>
<description>Issue 53</description>
<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 00:30:57 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-04-08T00:30:57Z</dc:date>
<item>
<title>Kıbrıs Celvetiliğinde Unutulmuş Bir Mirasın Yeniden Hatırlanışı: Magosa Kutup Osman Efendi Türbe ve Dergâhının İnşa ve İhyası</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12723/2498</link>
<description>Kıbrıs Celvetiliğinde Unutulmuş Bir Mirasın Yeniden Hatırlanışı: Magosa Kutup Osman Efendi Türbe ve Dergâhının İnşa ve İhyası
Eyyamoğlu, Mustafa; Pilehvarian, Nuran Kara
This article about the Kutup Osman Efendi Dervish Lodge, located outside of the walls of Famagusta in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, focuses on the changes the lodge went through especially before the nineteenth century based on the archival documents, engravings, maps and the recent literature. Atpazari Osman Fazlı Efendi (1632-1691), who was among the most salient figures of Celvetiye brotherhood and who dispatched around 150 disciples, including the renowned İsmail Hakkı Bursevi, to various parts of the Ottoman Empire, ended up being exiled to Famagusta where he deceased in 1691 because of his significant degree of intervention in politics in Istanbul. The tomb of this significant figure, who was buried in the outskirts of the Ottoman Graveyard located outside of the walls of the Famagusta, was eventually lost. Seyyid Mehmet Aga, also a member of the Celvetiye brotherhood and a head royal door-keeper, who was appointed to Cyprus as a tax officer (muhassil), found his tomb and built a mausoleum for him. Even though this mausoleum is mentioned in the endowment deeds, there is no mention of the masjid built next to it. Similarly, the fact that there was a dervish lodge in that location previously goes unnoticed. This article examines the mausoleum and the construction around it, the historical evolution of the area since the conquest of Cyprus, and it analyzes centuries-long archeological/cultural layers while observing the transformation of this previously Christian site into an Islamic one.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12723/2498</guid>
<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Osmanlı Devleti’nin Son Döneminde Süryani Kilisesi ve Süryanilerin İdaresi</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12723/2497</link>
<description>Osmanlı Devleti’nin Son Döneminde Süryani Kilisesi ve Süryanilerin İdaresi
Güllü, Ramazan Erhan
The Syriac Orthodox Community in the Ottoman State were administratively affiliated with the Armenian Patriarchate. Only the Greeks, Armenians and Jews were accepted as non-Muslim nations in the millet system organized by Fatih Sultan Mehmet after the conquest of Istanbul. Other Christian groups except for the Greeks and the Armenians were administratively linked to the Greek or Armenian Patriarchate. The Syriac Orthodox Community were in charge of the Armenian Patriarchate. This administrative structure continued until the 19th century. Hereafter the classical millet system would undergo change. The state began to recognize some Christian communities other than the Greek, Armenian and Jewish as separate millets, and to give the existing millets some constitutional rights different from previous periods. The Syriac Orthodox Community failed to achieve such a right in this period. In the mid-19th century, they opened their own agency in Istanbul to carry out their relations directly with the state. Yet, this would not mean that the Syrians would perform their relations directly with the state. The Armenian Patriarchate was still an intermediary between The Syriac Orthodox Community and the state. This causedvarious problems with the Armenian Patriarchate and the Armenian millet, leading to struggles between the Armenian and Syriac Orthodox communities. The Syriac Orthodox Community officially applied for the right to be recognized as a separate millet under their own name in 1914, just like other non-Muslim millets living in the Ottoman State. With The Süryani Kadîm Milleti Nizamnamesi, the Syriac Orthodox community appealed for the constitutional rights which were acquired by the Greek, Armenian and Jewish millets 50 years ago. In this paper, the administrative process experienced by the Syriac Orthodox millet under the Ottoman administration, the negative effects of Syriac Orthodox’s affiliation to the Armenian Patriarchate, the attempts to leave the Patriarchate, the Armenian - Syriac Orthodox strife experienced during these efforts and the statute demanded in 1914 will be examined. Through a detailed analysis of the contents of the “Nizamname”, the similarities and differences between the “Nizamname”s of the other non-Muslim millets will be shown.
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<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda “Sürat” Topçuluğu II (1773-1807): Taktik, Talim, Muharebe Performansı ve Nizâm-ı Cedid</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12723/2496</link>
<description>Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda “Sürat” Topçuluğu II (1773-1807): Taktik, Talim, Muharebe Performansı ve Nizâm-ı Cedid
Yeşil, Fatih; Gezer, Ömer
In the Eighteenth Century, fundamental changes in the casting technology influenced the battlefield tactics. Seven Years Wars marked the end of the artillery tactics based on static defense and siege warfare. The Ottoman Army became acquainted with these tactics in Russo-Ottoman War (1768-1774). The humiliating defeat in Kagul caused the Ottoman Army to overhaul its artillery corps and establish rapid-fire artillery. Even though the rapid-fire artillery gunners deserted from the battlefield in their very first battle, the Ottoman government did not abandon the idea of creating an artillery corps which supported cavalry and infantry. To compete with the Russian and Habsburg armies, Ottomans continued to drill the rapid-fire artillery corps and manufacture ammunition for the new type cannons. However, in the Russo-Habsburg-Ottoman war (1787-1792), the performance of rapid-fire artillery corps was, once more, critically inadequate. Needless to say, the problems in manufacturing, transportation, provision and funding were important in this result but these were not indigenous for the Ottoman Army. The re organization of the artillery corps in general and the integration of rapid-artillery gunners in this new organization was the result of these battlefield lessons. During the reign of Selim III, not only was the organization of the artillery changed, but the casting technology and standards of the cannons were re arranged in line with the French standards.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12723/2496</guid>
<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>The First Cretan Rebellion against the Ottoman Authority: Narratives and Sources</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12723/2495</link>
<description>The First Cretan Rebellion against the Ottoman Authority: Narratives and Sources
Öztürk, Yakup
Girit’teki Osmanlı egemenliğini tehdit eden ilk ayaklanma, Daskaloyannis önderliğindeki Sfakiotlar tarafından 1770 yılında başlatılmıştır. Bu çalışmada kısa sürede başarısızlıkla neticelenen ayaklanmanın tarihsel bir bağlama oturtulması amaçlanmaktadır. Bunu yaparken 1768-1774 Osmanlı-Rus savaşı esnasında patlak veren 1770 Mora İhtilali’nin (Orlov İsyanı) bir uzantısı olarak ortaya çıkan bu ayaklanmanın altında yatan siyasî, dinî ve sosyoekonomik nedenler irdelenmekte ve ayaklanmanın sonuçları incelenmektedir. Ayrıca, büyük bir felaketle neticelenmesine rağmen ayaklanmanın ve liderinin on dokuzuncu yüzyıl boyunca Yunan tarih yazımında destanlaşırken Osmanlı ve modern Türk tarih yazımında olumlu veya olumsuz bir karşılık bulmamasının muhtemel sebepleri gündeme getirilmektedir. Çalışmada isyancıların davalarını hangi dinî ve siyasî argümanlar üzerine inşa ettiği ve Osmanlı yöneticilerinin bu ayaklanmaya nasıl tepki verdiği tartışılmaktadır.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12723/2495</guid>
<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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